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Synthesis
Social-ecological enabling conditions for payments for ecosystem services
Heidi R. Huber-Stearns 1, Drew E. Bennett 2, Stephen Posner 3,4, Ryan C. Richards 5,6, Jenn Hoyle Fair 7, Stella J. M. Cousins 8 
and Chelsie L. Romulo 5,6
ABSTRACT. The concept of “enabling conditions” centers on conditions that facilitate approaches to addressing social and ecological
challenges. Although multiple fields have independently addressed the concept of enabling conditions, the literature lacks a shared
understanding or integration of concepts. We propose a more synthesized understanding of enabling conditions beyond disciplinary
boundaries by focusing on the enabling conditions that influence the implementation of a range of environmental policies termed
payments for ecosystem services (PES). Through an analysis of key literature from different disciplinary perspectives, we examined
how researchers and practitioners refer to and identify enabling conditions within the context of PES. Through our synthesis, we
identified 24 distinct enabling conditions organized within 4 broad themes: biophysical, economic, governance, and social-cultural
conditions. We found that the literature coalesces around certain enabling conditions, such as strong ecosystem science and existing
institutions, regardless of disciplinary background or journal audience. We also observed key differences in how authors perceive the
direction of influence for property type, program objectives, and number of actors. Additionally, we noted an emphasis on the importance
of the contextual nature of many enabling conditions that may cause certain conditions to have a disproportionate impact on successful
implementation in some circumstances. Unraveling the relative importance of specific enabling conditions in diverse contexts remains
a research frontier. Ultimately, no single disciplinary perspective is likely to provide all necessary insights for PES creation, and given
the intertwined nature of enabling conditions, practitioners need to consider insights from multiple dimensions. Our work suggests
opportunities to better connect diverse conversations through integration of concepts, a common vocabulary, and a synthetic framework.
Key Words: content analysis; enabling conditions; environmental governance; environmental synthesis; payments for ecosystem services;
social-ecological systems
INTRODUCTION
In a time of increasing global environmental change, there is a
pressing need to develop governance structures and associated
management regimes to address social and ecological challenges
(Anderies 2015). Despite interest in and experimentation with
multiple approaches to environmental conservation, there are still
major questions about what factors influence the viability of
different strategies given a diversity of contexts. In particular, the
concept of “enabling conditions” has emerged, highlighting the
necessary conditions for establishing approaches to addressing
social and ecological challenges. Multiple fields have addressed
the concept of enabling conditions including economics (Coase
1960, Jack et al. 2008), political science (Sabatier 1986, Agrawal
2001, Ostrom 2009), and ecology (Rands et al. 2010). However,
this dialogue often occurs within an academic field, with limited
interaction across theoretical lenses. The true value of these
contributions is in the collective understanding of enabling
conditions, which is largely deficient, resulting in a lack of
convergence on shared vocabulary or integration of concepts.
Synthesizing these disconnected concepts to create common
language and understanding is an important initial step toward
building more robust theory on the concept of enabling
conditions to inform policy and practice in the management of
social-ecological systems.  
We focus on the enabling conditions influencing the
implementation of a range of environmental policies termed
payments for ecosystem services (PES). In concept, PES
compensates those who protect, restore, or enhance benefits
humans receive from nature (Engel et al. 2008, Tacconi 2012). We
chose a discrete focal topic (PES) to understand the breadth of
work related to enabling conditions in a specific policy arena and
to connect these insights to the broader scholarship on the topic
of enabling conditions. Through a review of key literature from
different disciplinary perspectives, we seek to understand how
researchers and practitioners refer to and identify enabling
conditions within the context of PES.  
Our purpose is to summarize the recent and expanding literature
to: (1) identify how enabling conditions are described in the
literature in relation to PES; (2) synthesize the findings from
diverse fields to develop a more cohesive set of enabling
conditions; and (3) develop theory on social-ecological enabling
conditions by integrating insights from multiple disciplinary
fields. In doing so, we bridge multiple disciplines and connect
conversations that are occurring in various venues on the topic of
enabling conditions for PES.
The concept of enabling conditions
We define enabling conditions as factors that increase the
likelihood of an intended change in the governance approach,
strategy, or management regime. The presence of enabling
conditions can facilitate the emergence of a particular
environmental policy, whereas the absence of key enabling
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Table 1. Examples of terms and concepts equivalent to “enabling condition” used in a range of disciplines and focal areas of study.
 
Terminology Focal Area(s) Citation
Variables associated with self-organization for collective action Collective action, new institutional economics Ostrom 2009
Facilitating conditions for the successful governance of common-pool
resources; Critical enabling conditions for sustainability on the commons
Collective action, common-pool resources Agrawal 2001
Antecedent conditions associated with the successful adoption and
operation of community-based collaborative governance arrangements
Collaborative governance Weber 2009
Appropriate social arrangement for dealing with harmful effects Transaction cost economics Coase 1960
Enabling conditions for policy implementation Ecology, biodiversity conservation Rands et al. 2010
Preconditions for policy diffusion Environmental policy, policy diffusion Kern et al. 2001
Social dimension that enables adaptive ecosystem-based management Resilience theory, adaptive governance Folke et al. 2005
conditions can present a barrier to management or sustained
policy action. The concept of enabling conditions has emerged in
several disciplines, including political science, economics, and
ecology, and has been applied to a variety of topics and in a range
of contexts. Equally diverse is the terminology used to refer to
the concept of enabling conditions (Table 1). We consider terms
in Table 1 such as facilitating conditions, antecedent conditions,
preconditions, and appropriate social arrangement to be
equivalent to enabling conditions. Given the lack of a consistent
and concrete definition for enabling conditions, we based our
definition on insights gained from the literature synthesis and
analysis we present.  
Several scholars have identified specific enabling conditions in
their research. An early example of this is Coase (1960:18) who
addressed the “appropriate social arrangement for dealing with
harmful effects [i.e., externalities].” Coase (1960) identified well-
established property rights and low transaction costs as the
appropriate or necessary social arrangement for efficiently
addressing externalities through direct negotiation. Other early
examples within public policy include Dawson and Robinson
(1963), who found correlations between adoption of certain
policies and political and socioeconomic contexts. This
exploration of environmental and political factors in explaining
policy adoption was expanded with Hofferbert’s (1966) model of
factors having an impact on policy output (termed the “funnel of
causality”), and other notable works that contributed to theories
of the policy process (Dye 1965, Bauer and Gergen 1968,
Sharkansky 1970, Weible 2014). This work has informed and
manifested itself  in forms, such as the Advocacy Coalition
Framework (Sabatier 1986), which integrates both ecological and
political factors explored by aforementioned authors.  
This early scholarship primed inquiry in later works, including
several significant studies that generated lists of enabling
conditions for the sustainable management of common property
systems. Reviewing these studies, Agrawal (2001) generated a list
of 21 “facilitating conditions” in categories identified by Wade
(1988), Ostrom (1990), and Baland and Platteau (1996). Example
enabling conditions included small size of the resource system,
shared norms among group members, and a high level of
dependence by group members on the resource system. In
summarizing insights, Ostrom (2009) identified 10 variables
commonly associated with the ability of resource users or groups
to self-organize to take collective action. These variables included
several of those outlined by Agrawal (2001) but also include the
predictability of the resource system, the mobility of the resources
being harvested, and shared knowledge or mental models of the
social-ecological system.  
Physical scientists have not engaged with the concept of enabling
conditions to the same extent as social scientists, although there
are some examples that inform the topic (Kremen 2005, Postel
and Thompson 2005, Quintero et al. 2009, Rands et al. 2010,
Keeler et al. 2012). Some ecologists concerned with conserving
biodiversity have addressed key conditions that enable the
implementation of conservation strategies. Rands et al.
(2010:1302) emphasized the importance of “creating the enabling
conditions for policy implementation.” Critical to establishing
these enabling conditions is the foundational need for “knowledge
about social and biological dimensions of biodiversity loss”
(Rands et al. 2010:1302). Beyond this foundational knowledge,
they argued that appropriate institutions and governance
structures are required to enable specific instruments or strategies
for conservation. Some of the specific institutional and
governance conditions include clear property rights, the ability to
enforce contracts, a lack of corruption, and a culture of patronage
that controls the use of natural resources. Ultimately, Rands et
al. (2010:1302) contended that “creating enabling conditions for
conservation is an essential component of the solution, requiring
conservationists to join with wider civil society groups pressing
for governance reform and institutional change.” Similarly, other
authors have advocated for an improved understanding of
ecosystem services of interest to better link ecological function
with the design of conservation programs (Kremen 2005,
Asbjorsen et al. 2015).  
Although much of the scholarship on enabling conditions is
associated with specific disciplines, recently the concept has been
addressed by interdisciplinary efforts such as those operating
within a resilience framework (Berkes et al. 2003, Folke et al. 2005,
Walker et al. 2006). In particular, scientists studying adaptive
governance have identified that the critical role of leadership can
help establish trust, a shared vision, and guide organizational
transitions toward adaptability. Transboundary organizations
that link social and ecological systems can play a key role in
establishing stakeholder networks, communicating science in a
policy relevant way to stakeholders, and lowering the costs of
collaborating and mediating conflicts (Folke et al. 2005, Sternlieb
et al. 2013, Posner et al. 2016). Government actors, institutions,
and related policies can influence environmental management
through the enforcement of laws, and by influencing local-scale
actors (Koontz and Newig 2014). Additionally, social or
ecological crises such as floods, changes in property rights
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regimes, or the influence of external markets can create windows
of opportunity that enable the establishment of new governance
or management approaches (Folke et al. 2005).  
As this condensed review illustrates, enabling conditions are
discussed by a diversity of scholars and disciplines across a range
of topics. This literature, however, is dispersed across publications
in multiple fields and remains disaggregated. Although relatively
new fields (e.g., resilience) have begun addressing these conditions
in more integrative ways, we suggest there is still a need to actively
synthesize understanding of enabling conditions beyond
disciplinary boundaries.
A focus on payments for ecosystem services
We examined the literature on PES to understand how the concept
of enabling conditions is being used in a particular policy arena,
specifically the creation of PES. Ecosystem services (ES) are
broadly defined as the benefits humans receive from nature (Daily
1997). Payments for ecosystem services is one approach to
integrate ecosystem services into environmental policies by
providing financial or other incentives to land managers (also
known as ecosystem service providers) to promote the provision
of beneficial ecosystem services or the land uses considered to
provide these services (Ferraro and Kiss 2003, Wunder 2005,
Muradian et al. 2010). This approach often involves identifying
the people who directly benefit from the ES provided, ES
beneficiaries, (Boyd and Banzhaf 2007, Nahlik et al. 2012), as
well as engaging entities that connect ES providers and
beneficiaries through transactions, e.g., public, private, or civil
society organizations often called intermediaries (Pham et al.
2010, Huber-Stearns et al. 2013, Bennett et al. 2014). In practice,
PES manifests in different policy and economic forms, depending
on the social, economic, political, ecological, geographic, and
other contexts in which it operates (Engel et al. 2008, Gomez-
Baggethun et al. 2010, Muradian et al. 2010, Goldman-Benner et
al. 2012).  
We focused on PES as an illustrative subject for a synthesis of
enabling conditions because it is an interdisciplinary topic that
has received significant and growing research attention over the
last decade and a half  and has addressed several important
dimensions common to environmental policy more broadly, e.g.,
program design, engaging multiple stakeholder groups,
monitoring, and sustaining program longevity (Jack et al. 2008).
Highlighting the relevant enabling conditions identified by
scholars to date could enrich ongoing discussions assessing and
reconciling PES in both theory and practice (see scholars on PES
theory and practice, including: Engel et al. 2008, Gomez-
Baggethun et al. 2010, Muradian et al. 2010, Goldman-Benner et
al. 2012, Sattler and Matzdorf 2013). In many ways, debates
surrounding PES embody many of the theoretical perspectives
that have engaged with the concept of enabling conditions, such
as the role of property rights and transaction costs (Engel et al.
2008, Kosoy and Corbera 2010), principles of common pool
resource management (Fisher et al. 2010), linkages between
biophysical ecosystem functions and the provision of services
(Daily 1997, Kremen 2005, Ricketts et al. 2016), and the resilience
of social-ecological systems to provide ecosystem services (Biggs
et al. 2012, Paavola and Hubacek 2013). Additionally, PES
researchers in different fields are not using the same terminology
for similar concepts. There is value in synthesizing these related
topics to formally advance the dialogue on enabling conditions
with a common language. More notably, many PES scholars have
incorporated several influential theoretical perspectives into their
analyses that shape how they understand and use ecosystem
services in their work (Bennett and Gosnell 2015). By focusing on
PES, our intent is to examine a specific tangible policy approach,
the lessons from which can inform the concept of enabling
conditions for environmental policies more broadly.
METHODS
Literature selection
First, we searched academic journal databases (including Web of
Science and Academic Search Premier) in April 2015 to aggregate
peer-reviewed academic journal literature on enabling conditions
and ecosystem services, with a primary focus on payments for
ecosystem services. We included both PES and ecosystem services
literature because PES is one term for a broader set of literature
on ecosystem services-based approaches. Because of the variety
of terminology used to describe enabling conditions, searching
databases with key words did not yield useful results. For example,
searching for “enabl* condition*” and “pay* for ecosystem
service*” yielded only five articles, three of which were relevant
for inclusion in this literature review, but did not comprehensively
represent available literature on the topic. Following this
realization, we decided to use a purposive sample of the literature,
to select information-rich cases aimed at insight about the
phenomena (Creswell 2009). Our intent was to find key cases that
provided rich information on the topic of enabling conditions in
PES, not to attempt a comprehensive analysis of all potential
articles.  
The literature on these topics is widely dispersed and spans
multiple disciplines, so an exhaustive search and coding of all
potential documents was deemed impractical and beyond the
scope of our research intent. We used our respective expertise in
economic, institutional, and ecological components of PES to
select articles known for their focus on enabling conditions (e.g.,
Kremen 2005, Wunder 2005, Jack et al. 2008, Muradian et al.
2010). We then used the reference lists of the selected articles and
database searches for similar articles to find additional references
to screen for potential inclusion. To be selected, each article must
have met all of the following criteria:  
1. Publication or in press in a peer-reviewed, academic journal. 
2. Published in English between January 2000 and April 2015. 
3. Used ecosystem services terminology, including variations
of the following terms: payment for ecosystem services,
environmental, ecological or ecosystem services, or market-
based transactions. 
4. Included terminology such as: enabling condition,
antecedent condition, facilitating factor, influencing
provision, or other similar language. We used the initial
literature review presented in Table 1 to find relevant
terminology to include in our search. 
Our approach specifically identifies enabling conditions focused
on factors that influence the creation of PES. This emphasis on
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Fig. 1. Enabling conditions for payments for ecosystem services (PES) programs identified from the literature.
the creation of PES means we did not include factors that were
explicitly noted to influence a PES program’s longevity or success
over time (e.g., types of monitoring and reporting conducted
annually).
Coding and table creation
Using the approach outlined, we selected 27 publications that fit
our criteria. We then conducted a multistage team coding process.
First, we independently reviewed and coded five of the selected
publications to identify the enabling conditions addressed in each.
For intercoder reliability and agreement, we created common
understandings of terminology, came to consensus about the
meanings of our codebook and process, and used a team of five
coders working in rotating teams for the remaining articles
(Lombard 2002, Manaheim 2007). We broadly structured coding
by key social-ecological themes (e.g., biophysical, economic,
governance, and sociocultural groupings) and included open
coding to uncover other specific themes (Creswell 2009). Coders
continually discussed findings to develop consensus on our
literature review and a common understanding of our coding
approach. Coders created a final combined list of enabling
conditions from all 27 articles. This full list contained over 200
identified enabling conditions, which we organized by similarities
in an iterative process to develop our broad themes and identify
specific enabling conditions (Fig. 1). We then conducted a second
review round to perform a saturation check and test whether new
information (in this case, new identified enabling conditions)
would be added to the analysis with the collection of additional
data (Patton 2002). After selecting and coding an additional nine
articles, we confirmed saturation because all enabling conditions
in these new articles fit within existing categories.
RESULTS
Our literature review resulted in 36 articles from 20 different
journals and over 34 different author sets, between the years of
2000-2015. The journals represented most frequently included:
Ecological Economics (7 articles), Ecosystem Services (4 articles),
and PNAS (3 articles). The represented disciplines included:
ecological and environmental economics, ecology, political
science, sociology, geography, hydrology, conservation biology,
and anthropology. The articles included single case studies,
comparative case studies, review articles, and theoretical cases.
The data presented in this section are a synthesis of enabling
conditions from all the selected literature.
Enabling conditions terminology from the payments for
ecosystem services (PES) literature
Similar to the variety of terminology used to describe enabling
conditions in the literature more broadly (Table 1), we also found
variety in how individual articles described enabling conditions
for PES. The articles included phrases such as: facilitating or key
characteristics, subcriteria, conditions, preconditions, and key
factors (Table 2). Descriptions of how these conditions had an
impact on PES structures were also diverse and often reflected
the authors’ disciplinary backgrounds. For example, Postel and
Thompson (2005:98) focused on the “institutional mechanisms
for safeguarding watershed services” in their institutional and
hydrology oriented article, whereas Wunder (2013:231) provided
a more direct explanation of “what necessary conditions are
needed to allow PES to emerge and function.” Ruckelshaus et al.
(2015:12) explained that when specific enabling conditions are in
place the “chances of early success and replication are high.”
Similarly, authors used a variety of resource contexts to explain
enabling conditions, including biodiversity (Kremen 2005,
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Table 2. Selected terminology examples for enabling conditions for the development of payment for ecosystem services (PES).
 
Terminology Citation
Conditions determining origin and function of mechanisms of compensation and reward for environmental services
(CRES)
Swallow et al. 2010
Context lessons based on previous experience with incentive-based mechanisms Jack et al. 2008
Facilitating characteristics for sustainably managing common property regimes (CPRs), or key considerations for using
PES as a management tool
Fisher et al. 2010
Conditions or preconditions needed to allow PES to emerge and function Wunder 2013
Subcriteria for effective, efficient, sustainable, as well as equitable compensation and reward mechanisms for
environmental services
van Noordwijk et al. 2007
Balvanera et al. 2006), watershed services (Postel and Thompson
2005), coastal settings (Waite et al. 2015), agricultural lands
(Kroeger and Casey 2007), and land-use change (Foley et al. 2005,
Jack et al. 2008, Ruckelshaus et al. 2015).
Synthesis of enabling conditions in payments for ecosystem
services (PES)
Our literature review, coding, and synthesis of the selected articles
resulted in 24 distinct enabling conditions. Figure 1 provides an
overview of the four broad themes and the associated enabling
conditions grouped within each theme, and Appendix 1 provides
a detailed summary of each enabling condition and the
supporting citations. We used the broad themes (biophysical,
economic, governance, and social-cultural conditions) to
organize the presentation and structure of the resulting enabling
conditions list. Although these themes provided more structure
for the presentation of conditions, it is important to note that the
conditions in each theme were identified from a variety of
disciplinary perspectives and fields, journal types, and author
considerations, so no one theme was solely represented by one
discipline.
Biophysical, economic, governance, and social-cultural enabling
conditions for payments for ecosystem services (PES)
The literature widely coalesced around certain enabling
conditions, regardless of disciplinary backgrounds or journal
audience. In particular, the majority of literature routinely cited
the need for both strong ecosystem science and strong existing
institutions. Strong ecosystem science was identified as necessary
for improved scientific understanding of ecological processes and
interactions that occur in a region in which specific ecosystem
services are targeted by a PES program. This understanding of
the ecosystem in question can have a direct link to the ability to
develop PES in a particular biophysical context. In addition to
understanding the ecosystem, this understanding must also be
translated to the stakeholders involved in the PES policy to
promote buy-in of the project or policy. Experts across disciplines
pointed out that successfully linking the ecological and social
values and benefits of ecosystem service(s) to human populations
could improve the likelihood of PES development. Furthermore,
authors stated that clearly explained relationships between
management practices and ecosystem service provision also
contribute to PES development, particularly if  the practices and
provision are readily quantifiable, i.e., the impact of increased
hectares in cover crop on water quality (e.g., Diaz et al. 2005,
Kremen 2005, Balvanera et al. 2006, Quintero et al. 2009, Rands
et al. 2010, Ponette-González et al. 2013, Asbjornsen et al. 2015).
The provision of ES and development of PES are tightly linked,
so underlying ecosystem functions such as productivity,
biodiversity, and landscape arrangement are also important
conditions for PES. In some cases, authors highlighted the
importance of the science-policy process, linking both ecological
and policy science to decision making around PES (Rosenthal et
al. 2015, Ruckelshaus et al. 2015).  
Authors also emphasized the need for strong existing institutions
to help facilitate the development of rules and management
structures for PES. The literature described these strong existing
institutions as legal frameworks, regulatory underpinnings, policy
support networks, government support and public attitudes, policy
windows, political will, and interplay of political forces (e.g., Postel
and Thompson 2005, Kroeger and Casey 2007, Engel et al. 2008,
Corbera et al. 2009, Rands et al. 2010, Lockie 2013, Muñoz
Escobar et al. 2013, Rosenthal et al. 2015). The fit of the existing
governance structure with the PES structure (e.g., hierarchical) and
scale (e.g., local to global) can also have an impact on PES. The
capacity of actor groups and the presence of specific actors, such
as intermediaries, to help facilitate transactions and program
operations were also mentioned (e.g., Engel et al. 2008, Kemkes et
al. 2010, van Noordwijk and Leimona 2010, Sattler and Matzdorf
2013). Similar to these considerations of institutional structure,
several authors noted manageable transaction costs as an
important enabling condition for PES (e.g., Kroeger and Casey
2007, Sommerville et al. 2009, Wunder 2013). These authors
identified how the number of actors, program organization, secure
buyer funding, and creation of provider cooperatives can all
influence transaction costs. Selected literature also described legal
preconditions, such as secure tenure and clearly defined property
rights as influencing PES development (e.g., Postel and Thompson
2005, Huang et al. 2009, van Noordwijk and Leimona 2010, Sattler
and Matzdorf 2013, Lambin et al. 2014).  
Multiple authors described how the size of the preexisting
biophysical and institutional system could have an impact on PES:
more clearly defined and confined geographic regions and
institutional contexts, both with clearly defined actors, can
facilitate PES (e.g., Armsworth and Roughgarden 2003, Huang et
al. 2009, Asbjornsen et al. 2015). To a lesser degree, some literature
also highlighted social and cultural conditions, primarily
interactor communications, use of ecosystem knowledge to inform
decision making, engagement and trust, existing structure of
markets and government, and awareness and promotion of the
PES concept (e.g., Corbera et al. 2009, Huang et al. 2009, Lockie
2013, McKenzie et al. 2014, Rosenthal et al. 2015, Ruckelshaus et
al. 2015, Waite et al. 2015, Posner et al. 2016).  
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However, several authors identified the same enabling condition
but provided opposite interpretations of the condition’s influence
on PES. In these cases, the literature was inconsistent about
whether certain factors were enabling conditions or barriers for
PES. For instance, several authors argued that intermediaries
enable the design and implementation of PES programs (Engel et
al. 2008, Kemkes et al. 2010, van Noordvijk and Leimona 2010,
Sattler and Matzdorf 2013) whereas Sommerville et al. (2009)
stated that intermediaries may inhibit PES by preventing direct
interaction and negotiation among ES beneficiaries and providers.
We noted key differences in the directionality of the enabling
condition for property type, program objectives, and number of
actors, but we did not detect a clear pattern from these differences
(e.g., Postel and Thompson 2005, Huang et al. 2009, Sommerville
et al. 2009, Muradian et al. 2010, van Noordwijk and Leimona
2010, Kinzig et al. 2011, Lockie 2013). We noted the differences in
directionality in Appendix 1 and attributed these inconsistencies
to the different contexts of individual studies (e.g., developed and
developing countries, different interested actor groups, and ES
needs).
DISCUSSION
Our synthesis provides a way to organize recent inquiry into the
factors that influence the creation of an environmental policy,
focused specifically on the enabling conditions that influence the
implementation of PES. This research contains implications for
enabling conditions in practice as well as theory. Our synthesis
provides important insights from diverse perspectives on enabling
conditions and highlights several challenges and areas for future
consideration.
The importance of enabling conditions to practice
Given the complexity of the social-ecological systems in which PES
programs are implemented, we see a need to provide natural
resource managers with the knowledge to understand the contexts
in which PES is likely to be a viable and effective policy solution.
Through our synthesis, we identified 24 conditions, organized
within 4 themes (biophysical, economic, governance, and social-
cultural), as a first step toward providing practitioners with the
spectrum of conditions to consider in the development of new PES
efforts or adapting existing ones.  
No single disciplinary perspective is likely to provide all necessary
insights for PES creation and there were many instances of enabling
conditions broadly divided along disciplinary lines (e.g.,
economists listing only conditions that fell into the economic
conditions category, natural scientists emphasizing biophysical
conditions). However, we found numerous conditions with broad
agreement, regardless of the author’s discipline. In particular, the
need for adequate scientific understanding of ecological processes
and ecosystem services interactions was echoed across fields
because of the need to quantify how ecosystem services are having
an impact on or being impacted by human communities; a finding
not surprising given the underlying premise of PES. Similarly,
articles from multiple disciplines noted strong existing institutions
as an enabling condition, which is reflected in current research in
PES (Corbera et al. 2009, Muradian et al. 2010, Vatn 2010,
Ruckelshaus et al. 2015). Given the intertwined nature of enabling
conditions, practitioners need to consider insights from multiple
dimensions. Emerging gray literature on lessons learned in enabling
PES (e.g.. Kushner et al. 2012), tools and guides, such as success
factor case studies (e.g., Ozment et al. 2016), and diagnostic and
economic approaches (e.g., Mermet et al. 2014, Hansen et al. 2015,
respectively) are increasingly considering multiple dimensions of
enabling conditions. The use of PES given different places and
PES options (or other policy or economic instruments), as well
as the policy or decision maker’s concept of PES, all shape the
type of PES developed. The issues we raise in this discussion
reflect current conversation in practitioner settings, which further
highlights the need to continue developing and linking enabling
conditions from science and practice.  
Over the long-term, we envision building upon this synthesis to
develop a road map to guide practitioners in fostering the range
of factors needed for PES development. We recognize that the
synthesis presented in this article is not sufficient for achieving
this long-term objective and is rather a starting point in guiding
this endeavor. Considerable empirical research is still needed to
understand a variety of important questions to better inform
practice. One such investigation is understanding the relative
importance of different enabling conditions and how they
influence program design and implementation. The 24 conditions
we identified might all be relevant, but only a few may have a
disproportionate impact on successful implementation.  
Some of the conditions may also only be relevant to certain stages
of the policy process. For instance, considering the proximity of
actors to each other and the size of the resource area may only
be relevant at the scoping stage to understand the overall viability
of PES in a specific situation. Maintaining stakeholder
communication and engagement and strong capacity among
actors, however, is likely to be important throughout the duration
of the PES program. Additionally, practitioners have varying
levels of control over the 24 enabling conditions. Although
practitioners have the ability to influence stakeholder engagement
and build capacity among actors, they have very little ability to
control the size of the resource area and the proximity of actors.
We used our best judgment to identify the relevance of each
enabling condition to the scoping, implementing, and sustaining
stages of the policy process and the levels of influence
practitioners have over the enabling conditions in Appendix 1.  
Additional questions also remain about the potential for critical
thresholds among the enabling conditions. As an example, strong
governance institutions seem to be a key factor enabling the
enforcement of PES agreements. However, PES might be viable
within a wide range of governance arrangements but only become
unviable at a certain point when legal institutions are ineffective,
i.e., a threshold is crossed. Similarly, a range of transaction costs
may be acceptable, but a PES scheme may become economical
only when a tipping point is reached. Increased understanding of
these questions will help guide practitioners in developing and
implementing PES programs.
The contextual challenge of enabling conditions
A reoccurring theme was also the importance of biophysical,
economic, governance, and social-cultural context. The emphasis
on the contextual nature of many enabling conditions is not
unexpected, but understanding how the relative importance of
enabling conditions changes from one context to another is not
fully clear. Similarly, the contextual nature of enabling conditions
may also explain why we noted cases of inconsistency in the
literature, particularly cases in which the directionality of the
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enabling condition conflicted between different authors. For
example, some literature noted that a small number of actors
would make organizing groups of PES users easier and therefore
facilitate PES (Corbera et al. 2009, Fisher et al. 2010), whereas
Lockie (2013) suggested that larger groups were needed to
facilitate PES by creating a critical mass necessary to overcome
transactions costs and spur competition. Interactions and
linkages among the conditions we have identified could explain
why the same condition could be an enabler in one context, but
a barrier in another context. In the example above regarding the
influence of the number of actors in enabling PES, differences in
interpretations are likely highly influenced by the institutional
environments and the capacity among state agencies and NGOs
in which these authors work. In contexts with strong existing
institutions and strong actor capacity, the challenge of dealing
with a large number of actors can be overcome, and the actions
of many actors can be coordinated through auctions and other
systems that facilitate collective action among many participants
(Lockie 2013). By coordinating a large numbers of actors, PES
practitioners can achieve efficiencies in scale and reduce overall
transaction costs. In contexts with less developed institutions and
lower actor capacity, a large number of actors can be
overwhelming to coordinate and prevent reductions in
transaction costs and increase barriers to meaningful stakeholder
communication and engagement. There is a need to better
understand the interconnections among enabling conditions and
explicitly consider their linkages in future research efforts.  
Context is also important in considering insights on enabling
conditions from PES examples in the Global North and the
Global South. Contexts in the Global North can typically be
characterized by strong existing institutions, strong capacity
among actors, and secure land tenure. Poverty reduction is also
less relevant as a PES objective in the Global North because the
strong institutional environment in these countries typically
means that there are other programs and policies in place to
address poverty concerns. Institutional settings, actor capacity,
and property rights regimes vary significantly across the Global
South and can even vary significantly within a country as one
moves from areas with a strong state presence to more remote
areas with less influence from formal state actors and institutions.
Although meaningful comparisons can be made across these
contexts, explicitly acknowledging the relative differences in
economic and governance conditions is critical to understanding
how these varying contexts influence PES.  
Many of the insights about the contextual nature of enabling
conditions came from case studies of individual or a small number
of PES examples. To more fully understand the importance of
context, scholars will need to move to larger and richer datasets
that allow for comparisons across many cases. The ability to
answer these practical questions, which will give natural resources
managers a much stronger link between theory and practice,
remains elusive and should provide the template for an actionable
research agenda.
Enabling what kind of payments for ecosystem services (PES)?
Our analysis also revealed a blending of concepts related to
enabling conditions for PES. Much of the literature discussed the
importance of various conditions that need to be in place to make
PES a viable policy approach. However, it was often unclear
whether this referred to the conditions necessary to simply set up
a PES program or the required conditions for effective PES. For
instance, the emphasis on the linkage between ecosystem service
provision and incentivized management practices was one of the
most commonly identified enabling conditions, yet numerous
studies have critiqued PES programs for their lack of such
quantifiable linkages (e.g., Huber-Stearns et al. 2015, Naeem et
al. 2015). Therefore, this condition is better interpreted as enabling
effective PES because there are many PES programs in place
around the world without this clear linkage. Similarly, conditions
for equitable PES were also intermixed within a larger discussion
of enabling conditions and were often not clearly distinguished.
Based on our analysis, we see a need to distinguish between the
aspirational ideals of PES (i.e., what is desired in an ideal scenario)
versus the essential elements for a viable PES program (i.e., what
are the bare essentials needed for PES to function), a need that is
challenging to distinguish in the literature.  
The differences in the interpretation of the type of PES being
enabled are likely a reflection of the larger, ongoing debates on
the definitional, theoretical framing, and practical dimensions of
PES (e.g., Muradian et al. 2010, 2013, Sattler and Matzdorf 2013,
Wunder 2013). A focus on enabling conditions can provide insight
into the underlying positions of scholars engaged in these debates
and their interpretations of how various enabling conditions
diverge in the creation of effective, efficient, and/or equitable PES.
For instance, in considering multiple versus single objectives of
PES, Kinzig et al. (2011) argued that the focus should be entirely
on achieving ecological goals to ensure effectiveness and
efficiency. Conversely, Muradian et al. (2010) emphasized that
efficiency and equity issues need to be considered together because
they are inherently linked through PES, but that PES objectives
cannot be determined outside of preexisting relationships among
actors. Further examination of enabling conditions can enrich
the ongoing debates among PES scholars and help to understand
and breakdown their respective theoretical and practical
underpinnings.  
In addition, we note that the enabling conditions of interest to a
decision maker, policy maker, or researcher studying a particular
PES (or potential PES) will vary depending on their disciplinary
and individual conceptions of PES (Laurans et al. 2012, Mermet
et al. 2014). For example, a biophysical scientist may focus on
different enabling conditions than a sociologist, and a decision or
policy maker could be influenced by their backgrounds as well as
economic and political agendas. Many of the articles we studied
included authors from multiple backgrounds in terms of varying
disciplinary homes, as well as both applied and theoretical
directions. This increasing use of multidisciplinary teams for
multifaceted social and natural issues is necessary to more
holistically advance human and environmental well-being.
Linking payments for ecosystem services (PES) enabling
conditions to theoretical perspectives
We observed clear connections between the broader theoretical
perspectives on enabling conditions (e.g., those presented in Table
1) with the literature on PES. Notably, nearly all of the broader
theoretical perspectives were reflected in one or more of the
articles we reviewed. In fact, many of the articles we analyzed
were strongly influenced by these theoretical perspectives and
several directly linked their analyses to one or more of the
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aforementioned scholars. For instance, several articles were
strongly influenced by Coase (1960) and thus emphasized the
importance of low transaction costs and clear and secure property
rights (e.g., Engel et al. 2008, Sattler and Matzdorf 2013, Wunder
2013). This is perhaps not surprising given that some scholars
attribute the ideas of Coase (1960) and transaction cost
economics as foundational to the origin of PES (Engel et al. 2008).
Other articles, however, linked to the broader literature on
common property regimes (CPRs) or “the commons” and were
strongly informed by scholars such as Ostrom (1990) and Agrawal
(2001), among others (e.g., Corbera et al. 2009, Fisher et al. 2010,
Muñoz Escobar et al. 2013). Swallow et al. (2010) integrated
multiple theoretical perspectives in their analysis including
examining the conditions necessary for policy diffusion provided
by Kern et al. (2001). Despite the strong connections of several
articles to the broader theoretical literature, over half  the articles
we reviewed were not clearly linked to a theoretical perspective
and were largely theory neutral. This suggests that this applied
research could be better connected to theory to structure analyses
and further develop the theoretical basis underlying the concept
of enabling conditions.  
Our analysis suggests several key findings related to the theory
on enabling conditions. For one, we observed significant overlap
and broad agreement on many of the individual enabling
conditions for PES and those outlined by the theoretical
perspectives on enabling conditions, even though the specific
terminology diverged. For instance, the enabling conditions we
identified had many similarities with the list of conditions
Agrawal (2001) synthesized regarding the sustainable
management of common property. This is especially notable given
our particular policy focus on PES and Agrawal’s focus on
common property resource regimes. Our synthesis builds on
Agrawal’s analysis by integrating insights from other fields such
as transaction cost economics (e.g., Coase 1960) and biophysical
sciences, which are more prevalent in ecosystem services studies.
Because there was significant overlap across the theoretical
perspectives, these orientations are not as “siloed” as they appear
and their points of divergence are likely because of differences in
contexts examined and authors’ emphasis on efficiency,
effectiveness, or equity issues. This suggests that there is an
opportunity to better connect these diverse conversations through
an integration of language and a synthetic theoretical framework,
such as the social-ecological systems (SES) framework developed
by Ostrom and colleagues (Ostrom 2007, 2009, Bennett and
Gosnell 2014, McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). There were, however,
key differences between the PES-focused literature and the
theoretical literature on enabling conditions. Notably, the PES
literature gives much stronger emphasis to the biophysical
characteristics of social-ecological systems. This clear emphasis
in the literature illustrates the influence of preexisting biophysical
context on the range of possible policy approaches. Given that
much of the research on enabling conditions has emerged from
the social sciences, we share a similar view as Vogt et al. (2015)
with regard to Ostrom’s SES framework and argue for an
increased integration of biophysical perspectives to advance the
theoretical foundations of enabling conditions. Focusing on a
topic that has significant participation from physical scientists,
such as PES or ecosystem services policies more generally, could
provide valuable insights into the range of possible policy
scenarios in a given ecological system.
CONCLUSION
Through a review of key literature from different disciplinary
perspectives, we sought to understand how researchers and
practitioners refer to and identify enabling conditions within the
context of PES. We summarized the recent and expanding
literature to identify the diverse ways in which enabling conditions
are described in the literature in relation to PES. We then
synthesized the findings from these diverse fields to develop a
more cohesive set of enabling conditions resulting in biophysical,
economic, governance, and sociocultural conditions. We used this
analysis of literature to develop a theory on social-ecological
enabling conditions by integrating insights from multiple
disciplinary fields, bridge multiple disciplines, and connect
conversations occurring in various venues on the topic of enabling
conditions for PES.  
We found that in many cases, enabling conditions research related
to PES was disaggregated into different theoretical perspectives.
Our work aligns with a recent focus on studying social-ecological
systems, and highlights social and ecological considerations that
need to be taken into account in developing environmental
policies such as payments for ecosystem services. Globally, as we
face intensifying natural resource concerns, issues of
environmental policy will be increasingly important for areas of
further research. Developing robust theory around the conditions
necessary for implementing novel policy approaches will help
guide those working in programs on the ground and enhance their
ability to address increasingly complex ecological and social
issues.
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Appendix A. Enabling conditions for PES programs identified from the literature with citations 
  
 Enabling Condition Summary of Enabling Condition Citations 
 
Small resource area a; 1 Smaller areas providing ES (as opposed to larger) facilitates the 
development of PES. 
Fisher et al. 2010 
Resource location and 
arrangement a; 1 
Proximity of beneficiaries to the location of ES provision 
facilitates the development of PES. Greater connectivity of 
intact ecosystems enhances provision of ES. Type and 
arrangement of land use impacts provision of ES.  
Foley et al. 2005;  
Kremen 2005;  
Sommerville et al. 2009;  
Fisher et al. 2010;  
Mitchell et al. 2013;  
Muñoz Escobar et al. 2013; 
Turner et al. 2013 
Wunder 2013;  
Well-defined boundaries of 
PES system a, b; 2 
A confined resource system with clearly identified ES providers 
and beneficiaries and knowledge of resource system boundaries 
both spatial and functional facilitates development of PES. 
Armsworth & Roughgarden 2003 
Huang et al. 2009;  
Fisher et al. 2010;  
Kemkes et al. 2010;  
Asbjornsen et al. 2015 
Existing fundamental 
ecosystem science and baseline 
data a; 2 
Basic scientific understanding of the ecological processes and 
interactions among ES in the specific ecosystem targeted by a 
program facilitates PES. 
 
Postel & Thompson 2005 
Kroeger & Casey 2007;  
Engel et al. 2008;  
Jack et al. 2008;  
Corbera et al. 2009;  
Huang et al. 2009;  
Sommerville et al. 2009;  
Rands et al. 2010; 
Swallow et al. 2010;  
van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010;  
Keeler et al. 2012;  
Lockie 2013;  
Ponette-Gonzalez et al. 2014;  
Asbjornsen et al. 2015;  
Rosenthal et al. 2015; 
Ruckelshaus et al. 2015 
Linkages between ES provision 
and management practices a, b, 
c; 2 
The presence of a clear link between quantifiable management 
practices or readily monitored ecosystem functions and the 
provision of ES enables PES.   
Kremen 2005;  
Balvanera et al. 2006; 
Quintero et al. 2009;  
Rands et al. 2010; 
Ponette-Gonzalez et al 2014; 
Asbjornsen et al. 2015; 
Rosenthal et al. 2015; 
Ruckelshaus et al. 2015 
Clear threat or risk to ES 
provision a, c; 1 
Clear threats or risks to ES provision can facilitate development 
of PES by increasing demand for ES or stimulating increased 
awareness of ES benefits and their need for conservation among 
beneficiaries. 
Kemkes et al. 2010; 
Rands et al. 2010; 
Swallow et al. 2010 
Waite et al. 2015 
 
Significant value of ES a, c; 2 When ES have clear value and benefits to human communities, 
efforts to protect these ES are more likely to occur since 
beneficiaries have incentive to compensate ES providers for 
provision.  
Kroeger & Casey 2007;  
Engel et al. 2008;  
Keeler et al. 2012;  
Ruckelshaus et al. 2015; 
Waite et al. 2015 
Low opportunity costs a, b, c; 2 Where the value of the payments exceed the value of alternative 
land uses to the ES provider and the alternative ways of 
receiving the same benefit exceed the cost of the ES payment 
for the buyer PES are more likely to occur.   
Engel et al. 2008; 
Jack et al. 2008;  
Sommerville et al. 2009;  
Muradian et al. 2010;  
van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010;  
Muradian et al. 2013;  
Sattler & Matzdorf 2013;  
Wunder 2013 
Manageable transaction costs a, 
b, c; 2  
Manageable transaction costs increases the viability of PES. 
Low number of actors or organizational structures such as ES 
provider groups and ES that are easier to monitor help to reduce 
transaction costs. 
Kroeger & Casey 2007;  
Engel et al. 2008; 
Corbera et al. 2009;  
Huang et al. 2009; 
Sommerville et al. 2009;   
Kemkes et al. 2010;  
Swallow et al. 2010;  
Sattler & Matzdorf 2013;  























Defining ES as an economic 
good or service a; 2 
Rival and excludable goods make it easier to design PES than 
non-rival and non-excludable goods, however, monopsony can 
help overcome these challenges. Agreed upon methods for 
measuring and valuing ES can also help in defining an ES as 
economic good or service and facilitate PES development 
Postel & Thompson 2005; 
Kroeger & Casey 2007;  
Engel et al. 2008;  
Jack et al. 2008;  
Kemkes et al. 2010;  
Sattler & Matzdorf 2013 
Economic growth a; 1 Rapid economic growth at local or national scales may increase 
the interest in and resources available for PES. 
Huang et al. 2009 
 
Presence/absence of 
Intermediaries a, b, c; 3 
The presence or absence of intermediaries such as “boundary 
organizations” may influence PES development and 
implementation. [+] Some suggest intermediaries facilitate PES 
by providing technical resources and bridging trust gaps among 
buyers and sellers. [-] Others suggest intermediaries may inhibit 
PES by preventing direct interactions and negotiation.  
[+] Engel et al. 2008;  
Kemkes et al. 2010;  
van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010;  
Sattler and Matzdorf 2013;  
 [-] Sommerville et al. 2009 
Strong capacity among actors a, 
b, c; 3  
Knowledge, technical expertise, financial resources, and 
stability of NGOs, agencies, and ES sellers facilitate PES. 
Strong capacity of non-state actors may compensate for weak 
state institutions.     
Engel et al. 2008; 
Jack et al. 2008;  
Corbera et al. 2009;  
Huang et al. 2009;  
Sommerville et al. 2009;  
Swallow et al. 2010;  
Lockie 2013;  
Huber-Stearns et al. 2013; 
Lambin et al. 2014; 
Rosenthal et al. 2015; 
Ruckelshaus et al. 2015; 
Waite et al. 2015 
Influential champion a, b; 2 Presence of an influential supporter of PES such as politician or 
prominent NGO can help overcome inertia.   
Swallow et al. 2010; 
Rosenthal et al. 2015; 
Ruckelshaus et al. 2015; 
Waite et al. 2015 
Strong existing institutions a, b; 
1 
Strong institutions (e.g., laws, policies, norms) can help the 
enforcement and adjudication of PES rules to ensure 
conditionality and provide clear and accepted mechanisms for 
revising rules. Pre-existing institutions that support conservation 
efforts can also provide the background in which PES can be 
designed to fill specific gaps.   
Postel & Thompson 2005 
Kroeger & Casey 2007;  
Engel et al. 2008;  
Corbera et al. 2009;  
Huang et al. 2009;  
Sommerville et al. 2009;  
Fisher et al. 2010;  
Rands et al. 2010; 
Swallow et al. 2010;  
Pirard 2012; 
Huber-Stearns et al. 2013; 
Lockie 2013;  
Muñoz Escobar et al. 2013; 
Muradian et al. 2013;  
Sattler and Matzdorf 2013; 
Ruckelshaus et al. 2015;  
Waite et al. 2015 
Secure land tenure and property 
type a, b, c; 2 
Secure tenure and clearly defined property rights facilitate PES. 
Property type (e.g., private [+], public [+ or -], communal [-]) 
may also influence PES development.  
Postel and Thompson 2005 
Engel et al. 2008; 
Jack et al. 2008;  
Huang et al. 2009;  
Sommerville et al. 2009;  
Rands et al. 2010; 
Swallow et al. 2010;  
van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010;  
Sattler & Matzdorf 2013;  
Wunder 2013 
Lambin et al. 2014 
Fit of governance structure with 
scale of PES b; 3 
The governance structure ideally fits the scale of the PES. Local 
governance typically facilitates PES development more than 
top-down/hierarchical structures   
Postel & Thompson 2005 
Corbera et al. 2009;  
Huang et al. 2009;  
Sommerville et al. 2009; 
Ruckelshaus et al. 2015;  
Waite et al 2015  
Multiple/single PES objectives 
a, b; 3 
[+] Some scholars suggest multiple goals including social or 
economic development objectives facilitate PES development. 
[-] Others argue multiple objectives hinder PES. 
 
Sommerville et al. 2009; 
Muradian et al. 2010;  

















 Trust and transparency among 
actors a, b, c; 2 
High levels of trust and transparency among actors creates an 
environment of perceived fairness conducive to PES  
Wunder 2013;  
Corbera et al. 2009;  
Fisher et al. 2010;  
Muradian et al. 2010;  
Rands et al. 2010; 
Swallow et al 2010; 
van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010;  
Lambin et al. 2015; 
Rosenthal et al. 2015; 
Ruckelshaus et al. 2015 
Stakeholder communication 
and engagement a, b, c; 3 
Stakeholder involvement and communication in design and 
implementation can increase the buy-in and perceived 
legitimacy of PES among actors 
Engel et al. 2008; 
van Noordwijk & Leimona 2010;  
Sattler & Matzdorf 2013;  
Rosenthal et al. 2015; 
Ruckelshaus et al. 2015; 
Waite et al. 2015 
Pre-existing market-based 
culture a; 1 
A preexisting culture in which compensation is common or 
expected can facilitate PES 
Huang et al. 2009;  
Lockie 2013; 
Wunder 2013 
Participant willingness a, b, c; 2 PES is facilitated when participation by providers is voluntary 
and there is strong support from ES buyers even if buyer 
participation is compulsory (e.g., government supported 
programs)  
Postel & Thompson 2005; 
Jack et al. 2008;  
Sommerville et al. 2009;  
Pirard 2012; 
Sattler & Matzdorf 2013 
Proximity of actors to each 
other a; 1 
Spatial proximity of actors, especially buyers and sellers, to 
each other facilitates PES  
Engel et al. 2008; 
Fisher et al. 2010;  
Muradian et al. 2010;  
Kinzig et al. 2011  
Large/small number of actors a; 
2 
[+] Some authors suggest smaller groups are easier to organize. 
[-] Others suggest smaller groups may not have a critical mass 
to overcome transaction costs or spur competition among ES 
providers. 
Corbera et al. 2009;  
Huang et al. 2009;  
Fisher et al 2010;  
[-] Lockie 2013 
*The literature differs in directionality for some conditions. In these cases we specify summaries and citations indicating the condition 
as supporting PES with [+] and those indicating the condition as inhibiting PES with [-].   
a, b, c  Superscripts denote the stage(s) of the policy process that the conditions should be considered (a = scoping; b = Implementing; 
c = Sustaining). These groupings represent our interpretations as the reviewed literature did not directly address the relevant stages 
of the PES policy process.  
1, 2, 3 Superscripts denote the level of influence practitioners likely have over each condition (1 = low; 2 = moderate; 3 = high). These 
groupings represent our interpretations as the reviewed literature did not directly address the levels of influence that practitioners 
have over the identified enabling conditions.   
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